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IN THE SUPREME COURT . , 
.,. . OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIXIE WHITAKER, aka DIXIE 
D'OLIVER 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 14329 
JAMES WHITAKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action seeking reversal of Judge Stewart 
M. Hanson, Jr.fs Order and Judgment pursuant to Respondent's 
Order to Show Cause for child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent's Order to Show Cause was heard before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge presiding on October 28, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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197 5. Judgment was entered against the Defendant in the sum 
of $840.00 and Defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $150.00 
per month for child support to the Plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and Order 
below to the extent it requires a child support obligation 
from Appellant in excess of $120.00 per month after June 10, 
1972. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on September 14, 1966. On October 21, 1971, Appellant 
was served with summons in Colorado, in Respondent's Utah divorce 
action. He made no responsive pleading or appearance and a de-
fault divorce was granted on February 10, 197 2, in the Third 
District Court of Utah. The Decree awarded Respondent $75.00 
per month child support per child, plus $100.00 alimony per month. 
Respondent remarried in March, 197 2. On Kay 15, 197 2, 
Respondent executed an Affidavit for Order to Show Cause in re 
contempt. Said Affidavit stated, interalia: "I further aver 
that the defendant is in default in payments as follows: He 
was to pay $120.00 per month as support ($60.00 for each child)11. 
After a hearing on May 31st, 197 2, Judge Emmett Brown signed 
an Order on June 10, 197 2, which reads, in pertinent part: 
-2-
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1. Plaintiff is given judgment against the defendant 
for the sum of $350.00 in unpaid support money. 
2. Defenant (sic) is found in contempt of court and 
sentenced to five days in jail. 
3. Defendant is ordered to pay $60.00 on the 10th 
and $60.00 on the 25th day of each month beginning with the 
10th of June, 1972. 
4. If he fails to make any payments from June to No-
vember of 1972, he shall serve the five day jail term. 
Appellant remarried on June 12th, 1975, in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. Shortly thereafter Respondent denied him visitation. 
Appellant instituted proceedings to rectify the situation. 
On August 13 , 1975, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., ordered that 
Mr. Whitaker could take the children every other weekend to 
his home. However, visitation still did not proceed smoothly. 
On October 20, 1975, another hearing was held by Judge Hanson, 
Jr., this time instituted by Respondent. At issue was the level 
of child support fixed by prior proceedings. Respondent urged 
that the June 10, 1972, order requiring $60.00 per month child 
support per child expired of its own force in November of 1972, 
thus reviving the $75.00 per month per child obligation in the 
original decree. Appellant maintained his obligation was $60.00 
per month as per the June 10, 1972, Order. It was undisputed 
that Appellant had made $60.00 payments twice a month since 
-3-
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November of 197 2, and that Respondent had accepted them. Ap-
pellant was two payments behind at the time of the hearing. 
Appellant was ordered to pay $840.00 in child support arrear-
ages although execution was stayed on payment of at least $10.00 
a month. A $75.00 per month per child support obligation was 
expressly reinstated for the future. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: 
Whether the June 10, 197 2, Order modified the child 
support obligation, or was a temporary measure expiring of 
its own force on November 1, 197 2. Construction of the June 
10, 197 2, Order is a question of law appropriate for decision 
by this court. 
y :
 } ' • • POINT I 
THE ORDER DOES NOT STATE THAT IT IS TEMPORARY. 
The June 10, 197 2, Order required Appellant to make 
$60.00 payments on the 10th and 25th of "each month beginning 
with the 10th of June, 1972". It does not state that the $75.00 
requirement would later be reinstated. Nothing in the Order 
implies reinstatement. Appellant was found in contempt for 
failing to make support payments due as of May 31, 1972. He 
was sentenced to five days in jail, suspended on condition 
that he make the required support payments through November. 
If he should default thereafter, he might be subject to later 
_4_ 
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contempt proceedings, but not to the five day sentence imposed 
for the arrearages as of May 31st* Thus, the child support 
provisions and jail sentence liability operate independently 
under the Order. ' r 
Child support payments are theoretically linked to 
the actual needs of the child and the ability of the parent 
to pay. The court must have been prescient to automatically 
adjust payments six months in the future as respondent contends. 
Further, if reinstatement of the $75.00 per month per child 
obligation was actually intended, the Judge would have insisted 
that an explicit statement to that effect be included in the 
Order. Sound judicial policy requires that orders be presumed 
to operate indefinitely unless specifically stated otherwise. 
The interested parties should not have to speculate as to im-
plications, particularly when monetary obligations hinge on 
the proper interpretation. 
Paragraph 3 of Judge Brown's June 10, 1972, Order 
states: "Defendant is ordered to pay $60.00 on the 10th and 
$60.00 on the 25th of each month beginning with the 10th of 
June, 1972." This is the only statement in the Order prepared 
by Respondent's counsel which relates to Appellant's child 
support obligation for paragraphs 2 and 4 deal with contempt 
punishment and paragraph 1 deals with a judgment for past due 
support. Paragraph 3 must be given its plain meaning since 
"... the same rules of interpretation apply in ascertaining 
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the meaning of a court Order or judgment as in ascertaining 
the meaning of any other writingf.•." Ex parte Ambrose, 72 
Cal. 398, 14 P. 22, 35; Rina;ldo v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
123 Cal. App. 712, 715, 12 P.2d 32; Bailey v. Superior Court, 
297 P.2d 795, 801. Furthermore, "...parole evidence is not 
admissible to change the legal effect of a judgment or the ' 
record of it in any material respect." Kilpatrick v. Harvey, 
51 Cal. App. 2d 170, 172-173, 124 P.2d 367, 368; Bailey v. Superior 
Court, 297 P.2d 795; In Re Estate and Guardianship of Purton, 
7 Ariz. App. 526, 441 P.2d 561. Therefore, paragraph 3 of — 
Judge Brown's June 10, 1972, Order must be given its plain 
meaning regardless of Respondent's testimony on October 28, 197 5. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVIT STATED THAT APPELLANT'S 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WAS $120.00 PER 
MONTH. 
A judgment which is ambiguous may be read with the 
entire record and construed accordingly. Thus, in Huber v. Newman, 
106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780, 783, (1944), the Court construed 
an ambiguously worded judgment in light of the Conclusions 
of Law. Under the same rule, the June 10, 1972, Order should 
be read in view of Respondent's Affidavit stating: He (Appellant 
James Whitaker) was to pay me $120.00 a month as support ($60.00 
-6-
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per month for each child). On June 10, 1972, both parties 
believed $120.00 was the legal support obligation. 
._.. POINT III. 
THE FORMAL WRITTEN ORDER SUPERSEDES A 
MINUTE ENTRY IF THEY ARE INCONSISTANT. 
The Minute Order from the May 31st hearing reads as 
follows: "P (Respondent) is granted judgment of $350.00 through 
May 31, 1972. D (Appellant) found in contempt, sentenced to 
five days, suspended on payment of $60.00 on the 10th and 25th 
of each month through 11-25-72". Since Respondent's Affidavit 
stated that Appellant's obligation was $120.00, perhaps the 
judge did not recognize that a modification was taking place. 
Moreover, the minute order does not state that the $75.00 pay-
ment would be reinstated in November. As to the jail sentence 
liability, the final order requires payments "to November" 
while the minute order states "through 11-25-72." 
Arizona and Nevada courts have ruled that where a 
minute Order is inconsistent with a final Order, the final 
Order controls, In Re Estate and Guardianship of Purton, 7 Ariz. 
App. 526, 441 P.2d 561, 566 (1968), and Mortimer v. Pacific State 
Saving and Loan Company, 62 Nev. 147, 145 P.2d 733, 735 (1944). 
This result is sound because: 
1. The final order is the work product of law trained 
individuals familiar with the facts of the case 
whereas a minute entry are the clerk's no-
tations. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. The interested parties presume the final order to 
be the resolution of the ligitation.. <.-
3. The Judge carefully inspects the final Order before 
affixing his signature whereas he does not sign and 
may never see the clerk's notes on the minute Order. 
4. Copies of the final Order are given to parties and 
are carefully inspected by counsel whereas few 
people ever inspect minute Orders. 
POINT IV. 
COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE PARTIES1 CON-
STRUCTION OF THE ORDER AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR 
SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT. 
It is undisputed that Appellant has made and Respondent 
accepted $120.00 per month child support payments from June 10, 
1972, until approximately October lstf 197 5. Though Respondent 
allegedly has made oral demands that the $75.00 payments be 
resumed, she waited until autumn 197 5 to take court action. 
By that time the accumulated arrearages were $840.00, ci large 
sum for the indigent Appellant. Where construction of a judg-
ment has been acquiesced in by the parties, it should not be 
disturbed without strong reason. State v. Hawaiian Dredging Com-
pany
 r 48 H. 152, 397 P.2d 593 at 608 (1964)f General Creditors 
of Estate of Harris w Corriett, 416 P.2d 398 at 400 C1966). 
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A decision in favor of Appellant will not adversely affect 
the chilren involved. They have been well taken care of. 
The $850.00 judgment will in fact be a windfall for the Respond-
ent. There being no strong reason for disturbing the construction 
adhered to by the parties, the rule of the Dreging Company 
case should be followed here. 
CONCLUSION 
- .. .  v\ 
The June 10, 1972, Order should be construed as per-
manently modifying Appellant's child support obligation because: 
I. It did not state that it was a temporary Order. 
II. Respondent's Affidavit for Order to Show Cause 
dated May 15, 1972, which led to the June 10, 1972, 
Order stated that Appellant's obligation was $60.00 
per month per child. 
III. The formal written Order supersedes a minute 
entry if they are inconsistant. 
IV. The parties intended the change to be permanent 
as evidenced by subsequent conduct. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.'s October 28, 1975, 
Order and Judgment to the extent it requires a child support 
obligation from Appellant in excess of $120.00 per month ($60.00 
per child) after June 10,. 1972. (j* DATED this / v day of January, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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.. IN THE SUPREME COURT 
. . OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIXIE WHITAKER, aka DIXIE 
D'OLIVER 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 14329 
JAMES WHITAKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from an Order and Judgment of the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
Judge, presiding. . 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action seeking reversal of Judge Stewart 
M. Hanson, Jr.'s Order and Judgment pursuant to Respondent's 
Order to Show Cause for child support. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent's Order to Show Cause was heard before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge presiding on October 28, 
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1975. Judgment was entered against the Defendant in the sum 
of $84 0.00 and Defendant was ordered to pay the sum of $150.00 
per month for child support to the Plaintiff. Defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and Order 
below to the extent it requires a child support obligation 
from Appellant in excess of $120.00 per month after June 10, 
1972. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent were married in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on September 14, 1966. On October 21, 1971, Appellant 
was served with summons in Colorado, in Respondent's Utah divorce 
action. He made no responsive pleading or appearance and a de-
fault divorce was granted on February 10, 1972, in the Third 
District Court of Utah. The Decree awarded Respondent $7 5.00 
per month child support per child, plus $100.00 alimony per month. 
Respondent remarried in Marchf 1972. On May 15, 1972, 
Respondent executed an Affidavit for Order to Show Cause in re 
contempt- Said Affidavit stated, interalia: "I further aver 
that the defendant is in default in payments as follows: He 
was to pay $120.00 per month as support ($60.00 for each child)". 
After a hearing on May 31st, 1972, Judge Emmett Brown signed 
an Order on June 10, 197 2, which reads, in pertinent part: 
-2-
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1. Plaintiff is given judgment against the defendant 
for the sum of $350.00 in unpaid support money. 
2. Defenant (sic) is found in contempt of court and 
sentenced to five days in jail. 
3. Defendant is ordered to pay $60*00 on the 10th 
and $60.00 on the 25th day of each month beginning with the 
10th of June, 1972. 
4. If he fails to make any payments from June to No-
vember of 1972, he shall serve the five day jail term. 
Appellant remarried on June 12th, 1975, in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. Shortly thereafter Respondent denied him visitation. 
Appellant instituted proceedings to rectify the situation. 
On August 13, 1975, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., ordered that 
Mr. Whitaker could take the children every other weekend to 
his home. However, visitation still did not proceed smoothly. 
On October 20, 1975, another hearing was held by Judge Hanson, 
Jr., this time instituted by Respondent. At issue was the level 
of child support fixed by prior'proceedings. Respondent urged 
that the June 10, 1972, order requiring $60.00 per month child 
support per child expired of its own force in November of 1972, 
thus reviving the $75.00 per month per child obligation in the 
original decree. Appellant maintained his obligation was $60.00 
per month as per the June 10, 1972, Order. It was undisputed 
that Appellant had made $60.00 payments twice a month since 
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November of 1972, and that Respondent had accepted them. Ap-
pellant was two payments behind at the time of the hearing. 
Appellant was ordered to pay $8 40.00 in child support arrear-
ages although execution was stayed on payment of at least $10.00 
a month. A $75.00 per month per child support obligation was 
expressly reinstated for the future. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: 
Whether the June 10, 1972, Order modified the child 
support obligation, or was a temporary measure expiring of 
its own force on November 1, 1972. Construction of the June 
10, 197 2, Order is a question of law appropriate for decision 
by this court. 
;'•;'. , POINT I . . 
THE ORDER DOES NOT STATE THAT IT IS TEMPORARY. 
The June 10, 197 2, Order required Appellant to make 
$60.00 payments on the 10th and 25th of "each month beginning 
with the 10th of June, 1972". It does not state that the $75.00 
requirement would later be reinstated. Nothing in the Order 
implies reinstatement. Appellant was found in contempt for 
failing to make support payments due as of May 31, 197 2. He 
was sentenced to five days in jail, suspended on condition 
that he make the required support payments through November. 
If he should default thereafter, he might be subject to later 
-4-
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contempt proceedings, but not to the five day sentence imposed 
for the arrearages as of May 31st* Thus, the child support 
provisions and jail sentence liability operate independently 
under the Order. 
Child support payments are theoretically linked to 
the actual needs of the child and the ability of the parent 
to pay. The court must have been prescient to automatically 
adjust payments six months in the future as respondent contends. 
Further, if reinstatement of the $75.00.per month per child 
obligation was actually intended, the Judge would have insisted 
that an explicit statement to that effect be included in the 
Order. Sound judicial policy requires that orders be presumed 
to operate indefinitely unless specifically stated otherwise. 
The interested parties should not have to speculate as to im-
plications, particularly when monetary obligations hinge on 
the proper interpretation. 
Paragraph 3 of Judge Brown's June 10, 1972, Order 
states: "Defendant is ordered to pay $60.00 on the 10th and 
$60.00 on the 25th of each month beginning with the 10th of 
June, 1972." This is the only statement in the Order prepared 
by Respondent's counsel which relates to Appellant's child 
support obligation for paragraphs 2 and 4 deal with contempt 
punishment and paragraph 1 deals with a judgment for past due 
support. Paragraph 3 must be given its plain meaning since 
"... the same rules of interpretation apply in ascertaining 
-5-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the meaning of a court Order or judgment as in ascertaining 
the meaning of any other writing,..." Ex parte Ambrose, 72 
Cal. 398, 14 P. 22, 35; Rina;ldo v. Board of Medical Examiners, 
123 Cal. App. 712, 715, 12 P.2d 32; Bailey v. Superior Court, 
297 P.2d 795, 801. Furthermore, " parole evidence is not 
admissible to change the legal effect of a judgment or the 
record of it in any material respect." Kilpatrick v. Harvey, 
51 Cal. App. 2d 170, 172-173, 124 P.2d 367, 368; Bailey v. Superior 
Court, 297 P.2d 795; In Re Estate and Guardianship of Purton, 
7 Ariz. App. 526, 441 P.2d 561. Therefore, paragraph 3 of 
Judge Brown's June 10, 197 2, Order must be given its plain 
meaning regardless of Respondent's testimony on October 28, 1975. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVIT STATED THAT APPELLANT'S 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WAS $120.00 PER 
MONTH. 
A judgment which is ambiguous may be read with the 
entire record and construed accordingly. Thus, in Huber v. Newman, 
106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780, 783, (1944), the Court construed 
an ambiguously worded judgment in light of the Conclusions 
of Law. Under the same rule, the June 10, 1972, Order should 
be read in view of Respondent's Affidavit stating: He (Appellant 
James Whitaker) was to pay me $120.00 a month as support ($60.00 
-6-
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per month for each child). On June 10, 1972, both parties 
believed $120.00 was the legal support obligation. 
v ..'••.;. POINT III. 
THE FORMAL WRITTEN ORDER SUPERSEDES A 
MINUTE ENTRY IF THEY ARE INCONSISTANT. 
The Minute Order from the May 31st hearing reads as 
follows: "P (Respondent) is granted judgment of $350.00 through 
May 31, 1972. D (Appellant) found in contempt, sentenced to 
five, days, suspended on payment of $60.00 on the 10th and 25th 
of each month through 11-25-72". Since Respondent's Affidavit 
stated that Appellant's obligation was $120.00, perhaps the 
judge did not recognize that a modification was taking place. 
Moreover, the minute order does not state that the $75.00 pay-
ment would be reinstated in November. As to the jail sentence 
liability, the final order requires payments "to November" 
while the minute order states "through 11-25-72." 
Arizona and Nevada courts have ruled that where a 
minute Order is inconsistent with a final Order, the final 
Order controls, In Re Estate and Guardianship of Purton, 7 Ariz. 
App. 526, 441 P.2d 561, 566 (1968), and Mortimer v. Pacific State 
Saving and Loan Company, 62 Nev. 147, 145 P.2d 733, 735 (1944). 
This result is sound because: 
1* The final order is the work product of law trained 
individuals familiar with the facts of the case 
whereas a minute entry are the clerk's no-
tations. 
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2. The interested parties presume the final order to 
be the resolution of the ligitation. 
3. The Judge carefully inspects the final Order before 
affixing his signature whereas he does not sign and 
may never see the.clerk's notes on the minute Order. 
~ 4. Copies of the final Order are given to parties and 
are carefully inspected by counsel whereas few 
people ever inspect minute Orders. 
POINT IV. 
COURTS SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE PARTIES1 CON-
STRUCTION OF THE ORDER AS EVIDENCED BY THEIR 
'
 t- * SUBSEQUENT CONDUCT. 
It is undisputed that Appellant has made and Respondent 
accepted $120.00 per month child support payments from June 10, 
1972, until approximately October 1st, 197 5. Though Respondent 
allegedly has made oral demands that the $75.00 payments be 
resumed, she waited until autumn 197 5 to take court action. 
By that time the accumulated arrearages were $840.00, a large 
sum for the indigent Appellant. Where construction of a judg-
ment has been acquiesced in by the parties, it should not be 
disturbed without strong reason. State v. Hawaiian Dredging Com-
pany, 48 H. 152, 397 P.2d 593 at 608 (1964), General Creditors 
of Estate of Harris v. Cornett, 416 P.2d 398 at 400 C1966). 
.-8-
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A decision in favor of Appellant will not adversely affect 
the chilren involved. They have been well taken care of. 
The $850.00 judgment will in fact be a windfall for the Respond-
ent. There being no strong reason for disturbing the construction 
adhered to by the parties, the rule of the Dreging Company 
case should be followed here. 
CONCLUSION 
The June 10, 1972, Order should be construed as per-
manently modifying Appellant's child support obligation because: 
\..-. I. It did not state that it was a temporary Order. 
II. Respondent's Affidavit for Order to Show Cause 
dated May 15, 1972, which led to the June 10, 1972, 
Order stated that Appellant's obligation was $60.00 
per month per child. 
III. The formal written Order supersedes a minute 
entry if they are inconsistant. 
IV. The parties intended the change to be permanent 
as evidenced by subsequent conduct. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
to reverse Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr.'s October 28, 1975, 
Order and Judgment to the extent it requires a child support 
obligation from Appellant in excess of $120.00 per month ($60.00 
per child) after June 10, 1972. 
njL 
. DATED this j l day of January, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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